Much ado about nothing: Iran's gas deal with Russia faces long odds

According to regional sources cited by Al Arabiya and Al Hadath, the Lebanese armed group, closely aligned with Tehran, is monitoring ongoing nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States in Oman.

Hezbollah apparently fears that any Israeli strike targeting IRGC personnel could derail the talks and put Iran in a difficult diplomatic position, according to the report.

“Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to use every possible means to pressure Tehran and obstruct its nuclear progress,” the sources said, suggesting that any high-profile Iranian casualty in Lebanon could serve as a pretext for escalation.

IRGC officers are believed to reside in discreet locations in Beirut’s southern suburbs and in the Bekaa Valley, and typically move under strict security protocols.

Israeli intelligence has previously succeeded in targeting IRGC-linked figures and Hezbollah commanders during recent conflicts in Lebanon.

Neither Hezbollah nor Iranian officials have publicly confirmed the reported withdrawal request.

Last year, seven senior IRGC commanders and officials were killed in an Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate complex in Damascus, triggering Iran's first ever direct airstrike on the Jewish state.

A senior Iranian international relations expert has outlined three possible scenarios for the outcome of ongoing diplomatic efforts between Iran and the United States, warning that talks remain clouded by mutual distrust and external interference.

In an op-ed published by Farhikhtegan newspaper, Alireza Mousapour, a professor at Tehran’s Shahid Beheshti University, said the negotiations could end in either failure, a temporary agreement, or an amended version of the 2015 nuclear deal.

The first scenario involves a collapse of talks, which Mousapour said could stem from excessive demands by the US, such as calls for dismantling Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle or pressure from Israel. Such a breakdown, he warned, could significantly increase the risk of military confrontation between Tehran and Washington.

The second scenario, deemed the most likely, envisions a short-term agreement similar to the 2015 framework. This interim deal could lay the groundwork for a broader accord, possibly involving what the writer called a “less for less” approach where Iran seeks reciprocal, verifiable steps from the US

The third scenario involves an amended Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with new provisions attached via a United Nations Security Council resolution. This would preserve the original deal's structure while integrating updated commitments.

"This year, we will definitely pursue the removal of zeros," Farzin told an annual monetary and foreign exchange policy conference in Tehran. "It has been tried in about 70 countries such as Russia, Turkey, and Germany, and proven effective when implemented at the right time."

The announcement marks the clearest signal yet that Iran is moving forward with the redenomination plan first proposed in 2019 and approved by parliament in 2020.

The new currency system would peg one toman to 10,000 rials, aligning official usage with the informal practice already common among Iranians, who long abandoned the rial in everyday transactions.

Farzin stressed that the plan is being accompanied by broader reforms in the banking system, following the ratification of new legislation earlier this year.

"This is a year of transformation," he said. "We are moving from an old model of banking governance to a new one, underpinned by a series of newly approved laws and regulations."

Still, the move comes amid persistent economic headwinds. Iran’s inflation rate has hovered above 40% in recent years, and the national currency has lost more than 95% of its value over the past four decades.

A 10,000-rial note, once worth around $150 before the 1979 revolution, is now valued at less than 10 US cents.

Critics argue that striking zeros from the currency without addressing Iran’s underlying economic challenges—such as fiscal imbalances, monetary instability, and international sanctions—may prove cosmetic.

“The problem is not the four zeros, but the persistent inflation and monetary mismanagement,” economist Jamshid Assadi said in an earlier analysis. “Without reforms to central bank independence, fiscal discipline, and financial transparency, the redenomination will not have a lasting effect.”

Past experiences in countries like Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and Argentina have shown that currency redenominations alone do little to stabilize economies without deeper structural reforms. Conversely, countries such as Turkey and Germany only succeeded after implementing broad fiscal and institutional changes.

Iran’s caretaker Economy Minister Rahmatollah Akrami echoed some of these concerns at the same conference on Monday, warning that limited independence of the Central Bank, unclear inflation-targeting frameworks, and a lack of transparency have all contributed to Iran’s recurring macroeconomic instability.

“The effectiveness of monetary policy tools is limited in the absence of institutional strength,” Akrami said, urging a “redefinition of the Central Bank’s role” within Iran’s economic governance.

The new currency rollout is expected to span up to a few years, during which both the rial and the toman will circulate simultaneously. The Central Bank will oversee the withdrawal of rial notes and coins and their replacement with the new toman units.

While the psychological effect of dealing with smaller numbers may ease some frustrations for the public, analysts warn that without tackling deeper problems—such as rising liquidity, declining purchasing power, and a weakening private sector—the benefits of redenomination will be limited.

As global sanctions continue, not only for Iran's nuclear program, but for the country's human rights abuses and support of Russia's war on Ukraine, the economy is in its worst condition since the founding of the Islamic Republic.

Over one third of Iranians live below the poverty line with unemployment plaguing the population.

“The real question is whether this is meaningful reform—or just another economic shock dressed up as policy,” wrote Iran’s Jahan-e Sanat daily back in 2019 when the reform was first proposed.

Infectious disease specialist Davoud Yandegarinia told IRNA on Sunday that while there is no consolidated data on the number of new infections, an increase in hospital admissions and clinic visits indicates the virus is spreading again.

“It seems to be the Omicron variant, which remains the last variant of concern according to the World Health Organization,” he said.

Yandegarinia advised people with underlying health conditions, weakened immune systems, and those working or moving through densely populated areas — including healthcare workers — to resume mask use.

He also urged elderly individuals, pregnant women, heart patients, and those taking corticosteroids to continue using the same preventive methods employed during earlier stages of the pandemic.

“There is no need at this time to apply preventive measures to the general public,” he added, “but it is better for people to use masks in offices, closed environments, and hospitals.”

IRNA also earlier reported that Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi recently sent a letter to university health departments across the country, calling for increased precautions against respiratory illnesses, particularly COVID-19 and influenza.

Iran became the second country after China to officially declare an outbreak of the pandemic in February 2020, since reporting nearly 145,000 deaths — the highest official toll in the Middle East, with over 7.5 million confirmed cases.

However, experts have suggested that the actual death toll may be as high as seven times the official figures.

"Despite ongoing challenges and disputes in the current negotiations between Tehran and Washington, both sides appear to be making mutual concessions in pursuit of a deal," Iranian political analyst Alireza Namvar Haghighi told Iran International.

"Ultimately, because both sides are aiming for an agreement, they would meet each other halfway," Namvar Haghighi said.

He suggested that the United States may have agreed to accept Iran’s uranium enrichment—either in a frozen state or at a limited level—while, in return, Iran is prepared to accept stricter verification measures.

According to Namvar Haghighi, this compromise could serve as the basis for a potential agreement between the two sides.