Iran's president Masoud Pezeshkian in an event to mark May Day, Tehran, Iran, April 30, 2025
President Masoud Pezeshkian's government has yet to mount a defense to parliamentary motions aiming to impeach two of his ministers following the port blast that killed scores and injured more than a thousand people.
Hardline MPs have initiated a process that may result in Pezeshkian losing his energy minister Abbas Aliabadi and transport minister Farzaneh Sadeq, but the president has yet to enter the fray.
The inaction could be calculated, hoping that the impeachments calm a public angered by the tragic event and the lack of accountability. It could also deflect attention from the state entities involved in the port's operations which would otherwise take most of the heat for the apparent accident.
First to be named in the parliament was Sadeq, one of the very few female ministers in the history of Iran. She was to be held accountable for “oversight and inefficiency,” according to five MPs sponsoring the motion.
Calls to impeach Aliabadi gained traction shortly after. MPs blamed him for power outages that harmed households and industries. Surprisingly, some from the pro-Pezeshkian camp backed the motion.
“When a minister is weak, he must be replaced,” former presidential candidate Mostafa Hashemi Taba was quoted as saying by the moderate daily Arman-e Melli.
Another moderate outlet, Khabar Online, reported that hardliners in Iran's parliament—mainly from the ultraconservative Paydari Party—had been planning to remove both ministers since March, following the ousting of economy minister Abdolnasser Hemmati.
Back then, the administration didn't concede without a fight.
Officials and moderates outlets launched a campaign warning that impeachments would weaken the administration’s legitimacy, some even asserting cryptically that supreme leader Ali Khamenei viewed Pezeshkian's government as the Islamic Republic's last viable option and opposed destabilization.
Hardliners often submit multiple impeachment motions to increase the chances of at least one being approved for parliamentary debate.
Unofficial reports in Iranian media suggest Sadeq may be removed to show the government is responding to public demands.
Those with most power—and more likely to be culpable for the port blast—are expected to remain untouched: the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), for example, or the Mostazafan Foundation, which operates under Khamenei’s office.
The IRGC likely imports weapons materials through the port, which a subsidiary of the foundation operates.
The motion to impeach Sadeq has over forty signatures to date, according to an official tally, which can be read as a sign of things to come as no more than ten is required to set off the proceedings against a minister.
Previous initiatives to impeach Sadeq fell short, according to unofficial reports in Tehran's media, because Pezeshkian had hinted in closed session that she was Khamenei’s preferred candidate.
This time, the only outlet to come out in support of the transport minister is Etemad, whose proprietor Elias Hazrati serves as the government’s public relations chief. The daily has framed the motion as a move against the government.
Pezeshkian or his team are yet to publicly defend the two embattled ministers. It is a rare silence, perhaps signaling their patience until an actual battle in the parliament if and when the impeachment takes place.
Government keeps powder dry amid push to impeach ministers after port blast | Iran International
Iran's government has announced the withdrawal of a critical draft law on violence against women from parliament after hardliners watered it down, dealing a new setback to women's rights in the theocracy.
The bill—originally proposed by former President Hassan Rouhani’s administration—was intended to strengthen protections for women by increasing penalties for physical abuse and providing support services for victims.
But modifications by hardline lawmakers have significantly altered the bill’s core principles, leading the government to abandon the effort.
Hardline lawmakers replaced the term “violence” with “ill-behavior” throughout the draft bill and its title from “Safeguarding Women’s Dignity and Protecting them Against Violence” to “Safeguarding Women’s Dignity and Supporting Women and Families”.
Unlike the original bill, the revised version does not propose increased penalties for a broad range of injuries inflicted on women—such as cuts, bruises, or other forms of bodily harm but only limits harsher punishments to cases involving dismemberment.
“We requested the draft bill to be withdrawn when we realized that (parliamentary committees) had changed the character and substance of the draft bill," Zahra Behrouz-Azar, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s Women’s Affairs Deputy.
"It no longer addresses prevention (of violence),” she told reporters on the sidelines of a cabinet meeting on Thursday.
Despite the government's decision, the hardline-dominated Parliament is likely to move ahead with its own version of the law, the chair of the Parliament’s Social Committee Zohrehsadat Lajevardi has indicated.
The draft bill now mandates the Ministry of Higher Education to create separate classrooms, study spaces, and even universities exclusively for women when the original draft called for interdisciplinary research programs and academic courses on violence prevention as well as to establish counseling centers for victims.
“One cannot expect support for women from a parliament that has approved an oppressive hijab law," Iranian journalist Mina Emamverdi argued in a post on X. "The functional incongruity is a sign of the lack of a structural understanding of gender-based violence.”
A glaring example is a law that exempts fathers – who legally own the right to the “blood” of their offspring – from the death penalty if they kill them. Another law allows a father to pardon his children’s killers, for the same reason, if he so chooses.
Such provisions have led to lenient sentences in many so-called honor killing cases.
In a particularly tragic case in February 2022, Mona Heydari, a 17-year-old mother of three, was beheaded by her husband in Ahvaz in southwestern Iran. The victim’s father had helped the husband, his nephew, to bring his daughter back from Turkey where she had fled after being refused a divorce.
Pardoned by the victim’s father, the husband who had proudly paraded her severed head on the street was sentenced to slightly over eight years in prison.
“The lack of deterrent laws, legal loopholes, and the father's escape from punishment make domestic violence a modest crime,” Iranian journalist Samira Rahi commented about the recent killing of an 18-year-old girl, Fatemeh Soltani, by her father in a post on X.
The young woman had allegedly revealed her father’s infidelity to her mother, also a victim of domestic violence.
Under current laws, the father could face a maximum of ten years in prison.
Long journey of the proposed bill
The fourteen-year delay in presentation of the bill, first proposed by former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration and finally submitted to the Parliament by Rouhani’s government in 2021, reflects the broader tensions between maintaining cultural and religious norms and protecting women’s rights.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, weighed in on the issue in 2017. While condemning violence against women, he warned that government and parliament officials should be careful not to follow Western values in such matters.
“(Saying) it is violence if a father interferes in a daughter’s marriage (by not allowing it), for example … What is violence and what is not violence should not be learned from the West; it should be understood from our own rational logic, from our own Islamic belief.”
These, Rahman said, included a lack of comprehensive definitions of various forms of abuse such as psychological and economic violence and exclusion of marital rape and child marriage.
Rahman also warned over a provision requiring a period of mandatory mediation in domestic violence cases which could place victims in even greater danger before action was taken against alleged perpetrators.
The administration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is preparing to disqualify wealthier citizens from the country’s long-running cash handout program to save government funds as economic headwinds mount.
The program has persisted, with various reforms, for 15 years despite being blamed for distorting the economy and stoking inflation.
Now, Pezeshkian’s government is poised to introduce its own changes to ease the strain on a budget hollowed out by years of sanctions and economic mismanagement.
The proposed exclusion of wealthier households signals a shift towards a more needs-based support system as Iran grapples with persistent economic challenges.
About 30 percent of Iranians live below the poverty line. By removing roughly 18 million recipients from the program, the government aims to reduce fiscal pressure and redirect funds toward low- and middle-income families hardest hit by years of 30-40 percent annual inflation.
In the current fiscal year Pezeshkian’s government has allocated 3,240 trillion rials or about $4 billion at the current open market exchange rate, for cash subsidies.
The figure is separate from the extensive indirect subsidies provided to keep prices of fuel, electricity, water, essential foods, and medicine low.
Since the introduction of the latest subsidy reforms by former president Ebrahim Raisi's administration in May 2022, the rial has devalued by around 185 percent, from 280,000 to approximately 800,000 rials per US dollar as of April 27, 2025.
Consequently, the real value of monthly cash payments has fallen dramatically, now worth just about $3.74 to $5 per person for target groups.
Origins of Iran's cash subsidy program
The cash subsidy system began in 2010 under the populist government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, building on a controversial proposal made by his reformist opponent Mehdi Karroubi during the disputed 2009 presidential election.
Karroubi had promised a universal cash payment of 500,000 rials (around $50 at the open market exchange rates at the time) per person without a clear funding plan, drawing sharp criticism over its potential inflationary effects.
Ahmadinejad’s administration launched the Targeted Subsidy Reform Plan in late 2010, paying 450,500 rials (about $40) monthly to each citizen.
Funded by cuts to energy and utility subsidies, the program initially boosted Ahmadinejad’s popularity but quickly lost value as inflation and currency devaluation took hold. By August 2013, the real value of the handout had dropped to about $15 per person.
Rouhani’s response: the livelihood subsidy
Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration (2013–2021) attempted several times to remove higher-income households from the universal program, but efforts faltered due to the absence of a transparent tax database.
As economic pressures mounted, the government introduced an additional "livelihood subsidy" in late 2019 after a sharp increase in fuel prices triggered widespread unrest.
This new subsidy targeted lower-income groups, offering payments based on household size to about 60 million Iranians.
Single-member households received 550,000 rials per month (just over $4 at the time), with smaller amounts paid per person to members of larger families.
Raisi’s changes: new tiers and e-vouchers
Facing deepening economic challenges, Ebrahim Raisi’s hardline government restructured the cash subsidy system in May 2022.
Monthly payments to the highest-income 10 percent of the population were eliminated, while remaining recipients were divided into two groups: the poorest 30 percent received 4 million rials (around $14) monthly, and the middle 60 percent received 3 million rials (about $11).
To further curb inflationary pressures, in February 2023 Raisi’s administration introduced a voluntary scheme allowing families to receive their subsidies as store credit instead of cash.
Participants could use their credits to purchase a list of 11 subsidized essential food items such as rice, cooking oil and dairy products from designated stores.
New satellite imagery obtained by Iran International shows a huge crater left by the April 26 explosion at Iran's Rajaei port, which killed at least 70 people according to official figures.
According to the photos take on April 30, the large crater has been formed in front of the administrative building of Sina Marine and Port Services Development Company, which was the epicenter of the explosion.
Epicenter of explosion in front of the administrative building of Sina Marine and Port Services Development Company
In the images, the complete destruction of the building—located in the northwest section of the compound—can be also clearly seen, along with the adjacent warehouses and at least three other buildings. The trees in the area also appear to be completely burned.
Destruction of buildings adjacent to Sina Marine and Port Services Development Company
The images also show a large number of shipping containers crushed on both sides of the explosion site, highlighting the extent of the destruction.
Crushed containers belonging to Sina Company
Iran International had previously reported that the 15-hectare Sina yard, which could accommodate between 12,000 to 20,000 twenty-foot containers, was entirely destroyed. The latest satellite photos confirm the previous report.
Complete destruction of Sina Company's 15-hectare yard in comparison with a photon taken a month before the explosion
The new images also reveal the total destruction of a large administrative building in the nearby Onik yard, located to the north of the Sina area. Damage to this building has not been previously reported.
Complete destruction of a large administrative building in the Onik yard
Khazar Qeshm Company: 10 hectares
To the west of the Sina yard lies the yard of Khazar Qeshm Company, with an area of 10 hectares, which has been almost completely destroyed. The images show that the roof of the company’s warehouse, which is located approximately 500 meters from the explosion's epicenter, has been completely torn apart.
The three Iranian newspapers closest to the heart of power have adopted a maverick stance against talks with Washington, signaling that the theocracy's most powerful institutions remain deeply skeptical of diplomacy with their arch-nemesis.
While the Culture Ministry, the Supreme Council of National Security and the Press Supervisory Board issue ad hoc directives to newspaper editors about what to publish, three newspapers consistently defy those and often escape with a gentle caution.
They are Kayhan, Javan and Vatan-e Emrooz, linked respectively to the Supreme Leader’s office, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the ultraconservative Paydari Party, all of which continue to criticize the negotiations with the United States – in apparent disregard of the highest office of the realm.
Earlier this week, Kayhan, known for its staunch anti-Americanism, attacked those who back talks with Washington, accusing them of turning a blind eye on the harm done to Iran by US sanctions.
"Why should we trust Trump, a man even his allies do not trust," the paper asked, using some unusually provocative language to describe Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Ultraconservative daily Vatan-e Emrooz also cautioned in its editorial against advancing the talks in a way that would make withdrawal or retreat from any agreement impossible.
The negotiating team should be wary of leaving Iran vulnerable to exploitation, the editorial warned.
The admonitions and the critiques may not be as harsh as they were a couple of weeks ago – prior to Khamenei’s cryptic backing of negotiations. But the very fact that they keep flowing after the leader’s blessing of diplomacy is significant.
"Speaking without restraint at times ... our unnecessary objections, our lack of patience, and our flawed analyses of situations can have historical consequences,” Khamenei cautioned last week with no direct reference to the ongoing negotiations.
“Therefore, we must be very careful," he said. But the trio appear to have not received the memo. Or maybe they have.
The three dailies not only represent powerful factions within the Islamic Republic’s polity, but they also enjoy direct access–with varying degrees–to Khamenei’s office.
It may be easier, therefore, to explain their editorials as necessary objections, contingencies for a potential policy shift should the interests of the leadership require one.
No surprise, perhaps, that IRGC-linked Javan, the daily closest to and representing actual power, has shown the most balanced approach to the negotiations in recent weeks.
"Iran may wish to maintain its image as an anti-imperialist warrior. But who says an agreement limited to eliminating sanctions against reducing enrichment levels will tarnish that image,” Javan asked in an editorial this week.
"We have done this before. Why shouldn't we do it again...? No country in the world will characterize this as Iran relinquishing its ideals."
Unlike other outlets in Iran, which face severe consequences for minor errors, these three dailies roam carefree on the theocracy’s political plane. Whether or not their tone is part of a grand strategy by the topmost officialdom remains unknown.
"Some say that Trump is unpredictable,” Javan concluded its editorial. “Well, we are not that predictable either!"
Dozens of women in Tehran and Shiraz have reported receiving personalized text messages in recent days from Iran's Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice warning them about hijab violations.
What began as a pilot surveillance project in the conservative city of Isfahan is now quietly extending its reach to the Iranian capital.
The emergence of these messages in Tehran and Shiraz has triggered widespread concern that Iran’s hardline factions are laying the groundwork for a high-tech nationwide surveillance system to enforce mandatory hijab laws.
“I was visiting my father’s grave in the early hours of the morning when I received the warning,” wrote one woman posting under the handle @jesuisminaaa on X. “I sat there, crying and crushed. Someone there had reported me. How can a person think only about my headscarf in a place filled with grief?”
The message she and others received is stark: remove your hijab in public, and you may face legal action.
From cars to the streets
Since 2023, Iran’s police have used traffic cameras to detect unveiled women in cars. Registered vehicle owners receive automated warnings. If three warnings are logged, the car is impounded for up to four weeks. Tens of thousands of cars have been seized under the measure.
Many male owners report that no women—veiled or unveiled—were in their cars on the dates cited in the warning messages. Some female drivers also say they were not using their vehicles at the time the alleged violations occurred.
According to multiple experts and reports on social media, the institution is now identifying individuals by cross-referencing surveillance footage with mobile phone geolocation data, smart card usage including subway and bank cards as well as government identity databases.
The result: personalized messages delivered to women’s phones within hours of their appearances in public spaces.
Legal and ethical questions
The scale and precision of the operation have provoked an outcry from legal experts, activists and ordinary citizens.
“Law experts, please answer this: does the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice even have legal access to people’s personal data?” wrote Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, a reformist former government spokesman and law professor on X. “Let the country be in peace!”
The head of the powerful, hardline institution is appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and appears to operate independently of the government.
Both the Minister of Telecommunications, Sattar Hashemi, and government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani have denied the administration’s involvement or authorization for the expanded surveillance.
“It has been proven that the use of force in the realms of culture and society leads to counterproductive results. In the field of education, police and judicial measures have not been effective and will not be,” the president’s deputy chief of staff for communications said in a post on X.
“Blaming the administration and the president for the costs of repeating failed experiences is both inaccurate and unethical,” Mehdi Tabatabai added.
But critics argue that even if the government, parliament and the judiciary have no direct control and are not formally endorsing the measures, they are doing little to intervene.