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An analysis of discrepancies between tanker tracking data and China’s customs records shows Iran is using forged documents not only from Iraq, but also from the United Arab Emirates, Oman and especially Malaysia to export oil to China.

Hayyan Abdul-Ghani, Iraq’s oil minister, recently said that Iranian tankers use forged Iraqi documents to circumvent sanctions and the issue has been reported to the United States. Iran’s oil ministry dismissed these remarks as “negative and malicious propaganda.”

The Iraq case

Regarding Iraq specifically, data from Kpler, a commodity intelligence firm, and Iraqi domestic sources indicate that last year Iraq exported 1.19 million barrels per day (mbpd) of crude oil to China.

However, Chinese customs reported receiving 1.276 mbpd from Iraq.

In simpler terms, Iran disguised a total of 31 million barrels of its crude oil (equivalent to 86,000 bpd) as Iraqi oil and shipped it to China last year.

Statistics indicate that the practice has been underway since at least 2023. However, formal acknowledgment by Iraqi officials appears to have followed the tightening of Iran sanctions enforcement by the new US administration under President Donald Trump. Abdul-Ghani also noted that Baghdad has received reports of US naval forces seizing tankers in the Persian Gulf carrying Iraqi documents, but said Washington has been informed the documents are forged.

Iran’s LPG, mazut exports under the Iraqi brand

Since 2016, Iraq has been an LPG exporter. Kpler’s data shows that Iraq’s LPG exports surged last year, primarily due to the launch of a new oil refinery in Baghdad.

This development has further enabled Iran to sell its own LPG under Iraqi brand.

While China—importing a third of Iraq’s oil—does not purchase Iraqi LPG, but other Asian countries like Bangladesh do.

Several months ago, the head of Bangladesh’s Association of LPG Traders and Distributors sent a letter to the government and the central bank, warning about the entry of Iranian LPG shipments into the country with forged documents. The letter specifically mentioned a 10,000-ton LPG shipment carried by the vessel G YMM, which arrived in August under the branding of Iraq’s Basra Gas Company. However, in September of last year, the Basra Gas Company told Bangladesh’s Business Standard newspaper that this vessel had never loaded cargo from Iraq.

Additionally, Lloyd’s Listrecently estimated that over half of LPG cargoes claiming Iraqi origin may actually be Iranian.

Kpler data seen by Iran International reveals that Iran’s daily LPG exports soared to 330,000 bpd last year—2.5 times the 2020 level. Annual revenue from LPG exports (propane and butane) exceeds $10 billion, making it a significant component of Iran’s petroleum exports.

Previously, Reuters cited industry and trade sources in reporting a complex network in Iraq used for exporting Iranian fuel oil (mazut).

Kpler’s data shows that Iran loaded 230,000 bpd of mazut last year for export. This is a significant portion of its daily shipments of crude and other oil products.

There have been numerous reports about Iran’s use of forged documents to export oil and petroleum products under the names of the UAE, Oman, and particularly Malaysia.

The peculiar case of Malaysia

Kpler previously told Iran International that around 60% of Iran’s oil reaches China under the label of Malaysian crude.

Commenting on Iran’s rebranding tactics, the tanker-tracking firm TankerTrackers told Iran International: “Apart from Chinese data, there is no definitive way to determine the exact volume of rebranded Iranian oil. However, discrepancies in China’s import figures reveal the pattern—for example, when customs report 1.5 million barrels per day from Malaysia, but Malaysia’s actual exports are only a fraction of that.”

Samir Madani, an analyst at the firm, added: “If ship-to-ship transfers occur near Iranian waters and then head directly to China, the oil is most likely recorded as Iraqi or Omani crude. If the transfers take place in Riau, it’s reported as Malaysian.”

One striking discrepancy: Malaysia produces less than 570,000 barrels per day, yet Chinese customs data shows it imported 1.4 million barrels per day from Malaysia last year. Much of that volume is Iranian oil, along with some sanctioned Russian and Venezuelan crude.

Since US oil export sanctions were imposed on Iran in 2018 and 2019, Malaysia’s oil production has actually declined by 20%. Yet, its crude oil exports to China have increased eightfold over the same period.

Neither the Malaysian nor Chinese government has offered an explanation for how Malaysia’s exports to China are triple its total production capacity. The discrepancy, however, underscores the previous US administration’s broad leniency under President Joe Biden in enforcing sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

“The United States will also continue our relentless efforts to secure the release of all US nationals who are held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad and reunite them with their loved ones. We condemn Iran’s longstanding record of unjust detentions of and lethal plotting against US nationals,” said Tammy Bruce, spokesperson for the US State Department.

She called Iran’s continued detention of US nationals and involvement in lethal operations “a longstanding pattern of unacceptable behavior.”

The three men—Taqi Daneshvar, Reza Amiri Moghaddam, and Gholamhossein Mohammadnia—are now listed on the US Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.

All are linked to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), a body the US describes as instrumental in hostage-taking and overseas plots targeting Americans.

The move builds on the December 2020 sanctions against two other MOIS officers, Mohammad Baseri and Ahmad Khazai, for their alleged roles in Levinson’s detention.

Levinson, who disappeared in 2007 from Iran’s Kish Island while on an unauthorized CIA mission, is believed by US officials to have died in Iranian custody, though Tehran has never acknowledged holding him.

Iran has repeatedly denied involvement in Levinson’s case. Iranian officials did not immediately comment on Tuesday’s sanctions.

The US offered a reward of up to $20 million for information leading to Levinson’s recovery or the identification of those responsible for his fate. The State Department said its Rewards for Justice program remains active.

Due to the sanctions, any assets the men hold under US jurisdiction must be frozen, and Americans are generally prohibited from engaging with them. Foreign individuals who do business with them also risk being blacklisted.

“Iran’s treatment of Mr. Levinson remains a blight on Iran’s already grim record of human rights abuse,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement. “The Department of the Treasury will continue to work with US government partners to identify those responsible and shine a light on their abhorrent behavior.”

The Treasury Department added that all three sanctioned individuals were involved in the abduction, detention, and likely death of Levinson, as well as in attempts to conceal Iran’s role in the case.

The sanctions are being imposed under an executive order signed by former President Joe Biden, aimed at holding terrorist organizations, criminal networks, and other “malicious actors” accountable for taking hostages for financial or political gain.

The sanctions come amid heightened scrutiny of Iran’s detention practices, including the cases of several dual nationals held on security charges widely viewed by Western governments as politically motivated.

Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), dismissed Western threats to invoke the mechanism as "hollow," arguing that Iran's reduction of its nuclear commitments was a direct result of the United States' withdrawal from the deal and the failure of other signatories to uphold their obligations.

"If they had fulfilled their commitments and the sanctions had been lifted, and if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA, naturally Iran would have fulfilled its commitments," Kamalvandi said, using the acronym for the nuclear deal.

"If Iran has stopped its commitments, it is because it does not benefit from this general agreement."

He emphasized that Iran views the trigger mechanism as a pressure tactic, similar to economic and military threats.

"The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the trigger mechanism as a tool of pressure, like other economic and military threats, and will certainly stand firmly against these issues and defend the country's rights," Kamalvandi said.

While he highlighted Iran's openness to dialogue, he stressed that it would not succumb to pressure. "Iran is always ready for interaction, but this does not mean accepting pressure," he said, adding that the country's policies are determined by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program. The US withdrew from the deal in 2018 under then-President Donald Trump, reimposing sanctions on Tehran.

Iran has repeatedly warned of severe consequences, including NPT withdrawal, if snapback sanctions are triggered.

Activating the snapback would then fall to one of the three European countries, or E3, parties to the deal, France, Britain and Germany. Those powers are currently negotiating with Iran about future steps to salvage the agreement.

US lawmakers are pressing European allies to trigger the JCPOA's snapback mechanism, citing its nuclear deal violations. The bipartisan move, driven by concerns over Iran's near weapons-grade uranium enrichment, aims to curb Tehran's nuclear ambitions before key deal provisions expire in October 2025.

Britain has mooted willingness to eventually trigger the UN sanctions.

Iran has enriched uranium to up to 60% fissile purity, closer to the 90% needed for a bomb.

Iran's uranium stock refined to up to 60% grew by 92.5 kilograms (kg) in the past quarter to 274.8 kg, one of the IAEA reports said. According to an IAEA yardstick, the amount is enough in principle for six nuclear bombs if enriched further.

While Tehran has reduced IAEA inspections since 2021 and in 2023 barred a third of the inspectors, it continues to argue that its nuclear activities are peaceful.

The rial has halved in value since President Masoud Pezeshkian took office in August, deepening concerns over Iran’s worsening economic outlook, amid continuing US economic sanctions and negative regional developments for Iran.

The steep decline began after Israel launched devastating attacks on Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, in Lebanon in September, undermining Tehran’s regional influence. The election of Donald Trump, who takes a harder line on the Islamic Republic, has added to the uncertainty.

Last week, the currency dropped to one million per US dollar in Tehran, a day after Trump warned Iran of retaliation if its Houthi allies in Yemen retaliated against US airstrikes designed to weaken them.

The rial, which was valued at around 40,000 per dollar in early 2018, began to plummet after Trump withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear deal in May of that year and imposed tough economic sanctions, pushing inflation above 40%.

Prices for food and other essential goods have recently surged, with inflation in these categories estimated at 100%. As the rial continues to lose value, even higher inflation is expected in the coming months.

On March 20, the United States sanctioned Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co, which is known as a “teapot refinery” purchasing Iranian oil shipped by illicit methods to China in violation of US sanctions.

The WSJ said that after years of a lenient approach toward Tehran’s oil exports to China, the Trump administration finally took a step targeting the main source of Iran’s oil revenues. Chinese teapot refineries buy 90% of these exports and provide a lifeline for Tehran, which is financially strapped.

Officially, China buys almost no Iranian oil but its small refineries, not directly linked to government enterprises, unload tankers that wholly or partially carry Iranian cargoes.

“Unlike larger firms with links across the global economy, the teapots are less vulnerable to sanctions. But they tend to have links across the domestic Chinese economy. That’s what makes this move a warning to China,” the editorial said. It added that while Beijing might be willing to tolerate risk with its small refineries, it might not be ready to endanger US punitive measures against its bigger, state enterprises.

“If that’s trouble Mr. Xi could do without, he can make the business and political decision to drop Iran as a supplier. When Iran’s oil exports collapse, you’ll know the regime is feeling the heat. That’s when nuclear talks will have their best chance of success.”

President Trump last month announced the revival of his so-called maximum pressure policy toward the Islamic Republic, demanding talks to dismantle its nuclear program. Iran has responded by saying that it will not negotiate under Mr. Trump’s pressure, although it is facing serious financial pressures to a large extent brought on by US sanctions.