US-Iran nuclear diplomacy remains stuck in old patterns
Behrouz Turani
Iran International
The back-and-forth between Iranian and US leaders over Tehran’s nuclear program and the prospect of negotiations has changed little since at least 2016.
Iran International
The back-and-forth between Iranian and US leaders over Tehran’s nuclear program and the prospect of negotiations has changed little since at least 2016.
That was when US author and scholar Ray Takeyh published his book Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. According to Takeyh, since 1979, “getting Iran wrong is the single thread that has linked American administrations of all political persuasions.”
On January 31, 2006, “President George W. Bush described Iran as a nation held hostage by a small clerical elite that is isolating and repressing its people,” and warned that, “The nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons.” That sounds all too familiar, doesn’t it?
According to Iran’s official news agency, as quoted by Takeyh, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded swiftly and defiantly, denouncing Bush as someone "whose arms are smeared up to the elbow in the blood of other nations," and threatening: "God willing, we shall drag you to trial in the near future at the courts set up by nations."
That was 19 years ago, when Khamenei was still a relatively restrained Supreme Leader, delegating much of the incendiary rhetoric to his firebrand president. In 2025, he presides over a timid president who adds little to the official line — a line that is always dictated by Khamenei himself. In fact, Iran's rhetoric toward the current US President is notably more restrained.
Yet, as many observers have noted over the past 46 years, Iran and the United States have a tendency to address each other at the wrong times and in the wrong ways. Bush’s labeling of Iran as part of the "axis of evil" was just one moment that derailed budding cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan and sent both sides back into confrontation — a dynamic that persists to this day.
In last week’s exchange between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program, Trump delivered bold and harsh remarks on live television — remarks that Khamenei denounced as "bullying." But Trump also sent more conciliatory messages, according to his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, in a private letter to the Supreme Leader.
Given Khamenei’s well-known sensitivities, he might have better tolerated the harsh language in a private message and possibly even welcomed the friendlier overtures had they been made in public.
Similarly, Tehran’s responses over the past week — starting with a flat rejection of negotiations, moving to an openness to "indirect talks," and concluding with a vague “for the time being” — send a clear signal to US diplomats: Iranian officials are not interested in a public handshake with their American counterparts. Especially not after Khamenei has already set the tone with stern, uncompromising statements.
By contrast, Trump appears to want exactly that public moment — a warm handshake in front of cameras — to distinguish himself from his predecessors. This mismatch in the style and optics of diplomacy makes it difficult for either side to envision a path out of the current impasse.
As with traditional bargaining in Persian bazaars, Iranian negotiators prefer drawn-out talks, complete with repeated withdrawals from and returns to a draft agreement — all to eventually close the deal at the very moment when observers begin to believe it's off the table for good.
What’s different today is that some of those observers — both in the region and beyond — may not want a deal at all, at least not one that allows any form of nuclear capability to survive. For countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia, a weak agreement that merely delays the threat is less acceptable than no deal at all. They would rather see Iran’s nuclear ambitions completely capped than postponed.
In two speeches delivered in the opening days of Nowruz, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appeared to indirectly respond to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing a new deal.
In his first address, a pre-recorded message aired on state television, Khamenei blamed the United States for instability in the region. In the second, delivered live, he denied commanding Iran’s regional proxy forces but warned Washington of a strong response to its military actions in the region.
Tehran has yet to issue an official response to Trump’s letter, as few details of its contents have been made public. In a New Year’s Eve interview with state TV, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the letter included “many threats and a few opportunities.” He added that Tehran is still evaluating the message. Meanwhile, US media reported that Trump gave the ayatollah two months to consider before replying.
Perhaps in an attempt to ease the pressure on Khamenei, Reformist commentator Ahmad Zeidabadi suggested in a tweet that the Islamic Republic should hold a referendum to determine the will of the people.
Given the widespread concerns expressed on social media and in call-ins to Persian-language TV channels based in Europe and the United States, it's clear that the economy—and its impact on daily life—is the top priority for most Iranians. It would not be difficult to predict the likely outcome of such a referendum.
In a post on X, Ahmad Zeidabadi wrote that Iran has two months to choose between war and an agreement with the United States. “Tehran must make a decision while its officials are unprepared for either option,” he said, adding, “They believe an agreement would bring humiliation, while a war could be devastating. Hence, the indecision.”
Zeidabadi warned that some are exploring a so-called third path—one that could ultimately lead to both humiliation and destruction. He noted that the current situation was foreseeable and, in fact, some politicians had predicted it, but their warnings went unheeded.
He also pointed out that while referenda are mentioned in Article 59 of Iran’s Constitution as tools to resolve difficult political, economic, social, and cultural issues, they have never been clearly defined or seriously pursued within the Islamic Republic’s framework.
Khamenei, however, has consistently rejected the idea of holding a referendum on any issue, dismissing proposals even from well-wishers like former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami on multiple occasions.
Yet, a referendum could offer him a way to resolve the current impasse—allowing him to shift the burden of any potential compromise with the United States onto the people. Still, many who commented on Zeidabadi’s post on X argued that no meaningful referendum is possible under current conditions. They noted that without a free press, functioning political parties, and open public debate, a genuine vote would be impossible. They also called for an end to the imprisonment of political activists, the unblocking of social media platforms, and guarantees for freedom of expression and assembly as prerequisites for any credible referendum.
Some analysts believe the mix of threats and defiance in Khamenei’s recent speeches suggests he is thinking aloud, searching for a way out of the current impasse. As he acknowledged in his first address, Iran’s main challenge is its struggling economy, severely weakened by US sanctions. While he is unwilling to appear submissive to his archenemy, America, the only viable path to economic relief may lie in accepting Trump’s conditions—an option that would be especially difficult for a leader known for his uncompromising stance.
Others pointed out that the government has consistently ignored public opinion in the past and holding a referendum now would be shifting responsibility onto the people for any potential compromise. Some expressed skepticism that even after a referendum, the Iranian government would truly respect the people’s will.
One commenter remarked that, as usual, Iranians would be left choosing between “bad and worse.” Still, some speculated that Zeidabadi may be hoping a referendum would give like-minded reformists an opportunity to participate more freely in the political process.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi “informed Mr. Fuad Hussein of the contents of a letter from US President Donald Trump addressed to the Iranian leadership, represented by the Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei,” Iraq's foreign ministry said in a statement.
“He confirmed that the Iranian government will respond to the letter.”
Last week, an Emirati official brought a letter from Trump proposing nuclear talks with Tehran, which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected, saying such a proposal was deception from Washington amid crippling sanctions on Iran.
According to Iraq's foreign ministry, Hussein appreciated being briefed on the contents of President Trump’s letter and said he hoped that the exchange of messages would help open channels for dialogue between the two sides.
The two diplomats also discussed bilateral ties and agreed to continue communication, particularly during the sensitive phase ahead, the ministry added.
According to Axios, Trump’s letter to Khamenei included a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear agreement and warned of consequences if Iran expanded its nuclear program.
Iran's foreign ministry also released a readout of the call but made no mention of Trump’s letter. Instead, it focused on the escalation in Gaza and Lebanon following what it called brutal attacks by Israel, and the US military offensive in Yemen.
In part of the readout, the Iranian foreign ministry said Araghchi addressed US sanctions on Iran’s oil industry, saying the American claims and accusations aimed at pressuring Tehran were baseless.
The readout did not make any mention of Iraqi Oil Minister Hayan Abdel-Ghani who on Monday said Iranian oil tankers stopped by US forces in the Persian Gulf were using forged Iraqi documents, as Washington ramps up sanctions on Iran's oil exports as part of US President Donald Trump renewed "maximum pressure" campaign.