Looking from afar, it appears that Khamenei is banking on what he perceives as resilience of the Islamic Republic—the system, as he usually calls it.
If the system can withstand the storm, there may be a chance to negotiate in circumstances less treacherous and toward terms more favorable.
A historical overview could be enlightening.
The 2015 nuclear deal, officially named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was presented as a diplomatic breakthrough by all sides involved. It only came through, however, after heavy sanctions by the United Nations and the US under Barack Obama.
Khamenei reluctantly allowed talks, first secretly then publicly, calling it "heroic flexibility", and eventually nodded through the ensuing agreement, essentially accepting a halt to Iran’s nuclear activities while preserving the nuclear infrastructure.
But how should we read Khamenei's opposition this time? Is he truly and absolutely, as he claims, against negotiating with Trump?
His history of dual positioning suggests otherwise.
Saving the system at all costs
Contrary to the prevailing narrative, Khamenei’s opposition to a potential detente with Washington is not absolute.
He may not authorize talks if he believes sanctions, even tightened ones, are not detrimental to his system’s survival, or if he thinks other world powers could throw him a lifeline.
But what if he sees no such sign of relief on the horizon?
The Islamic Republic is arguably in a weaker position now than it has ever been, both internally and externally, with no clear outlook for a revival of the Resistance Front of armed allies in the region that it all but lost in the past year.
This reality may compel Khamenei to allow talks as much as it could force him not to, since he wants to negotiate from a position of power. In short, the unfavorable circumstances call for negotiations but the terms of the potential agreement forbid it.
It is Catch-22. What is to be done if you perceive the concessions required of you in an agreement as existentially threatening as refusing to negotiate in the first place?
Flexing over the fence
Khamenei’s answer to that question appears to come in two parts, either limited but aggressive confrontations, or, dialogue through intermediaries. The aim is to alter the conditions of negotiation or muddle through Trump’s second term.
Iran’s supreme leader will not hesitate to announce a variation on the theme of heroic flexibility, If circumstances align with his expectations.
If Khamenei were entirely opposed to negotiations, he would have fully withdrawn from the JCPOA and escalated into full confrontation. Instead, he has halted further uranium enrichment and adopted a defensive regional stance to strengthen his bargaining position and shift negotiation conditions in his favor.
Turning to domestic power dynamics, all factions appear to be singing from the Khamenei sheet, rejecting Trump’s proposal for talks.
Even then, the hardline principalists continue to criticize the relatively moderate administration of Masoud Pezeshkian because while the president himself is fully in line, some figures close to him utter out-of-line views from time to time.
The hardliners—and Khamenei himself—reject the moderates’ de-escalation and diplomacy as strategic solutions. They will keep doing so until they hit an impasse or arrive at waters calmer for roundtable.
In their view, hard power, including the now diminished Resistance, is the country’s primary tool in dealing with external pressure.
It is also imperative to national security. The continued attacks on Pezeshkian aim to prevent him from politically capitalizing on the situation and enhancing the moderates’ position within the system.
Khamenei would likely carry on sitting on the fence, ruling out talks with Trump in words but not deeds. Even in words, Iran’s supreme leader has been markedly measured when talking about the US president.
The Supreme Leader knows, better than everybody perhaps, that he may need to change tack at any moment.
