Iran International
As Moscow and Tehran seem determined to push ahead with plans for a gas pipeline linking their countries, critics within Iran argue against the project, warning that it could undercut Iran’s own gas exports.
Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his country aims to export up to 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Iran per year in the future.
Initial deliveries, expected to flow through an existing pipeline, are set to commence with volumes of up to 2 billion cubic meters per year.
The proposed pipeline by the two countries, is intended to deliver higher-volumes of Russian gas cross Azerbaijan to northwest Iran, with the potential of also using Turkmenistan as an alternative route to supply gas to northeast Iran.
Putin's announcement referred to a memorandum of understanding signed in June 2024 between Russia’s Gazprom and the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), outlining plans for energy cooperation between the two heavily sanctioned nations.
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States and the European Union imposed extensive sanctions on Russia's natural gas sector, with critics arguing that any potential gas exports could involve Iran helping Russia circumvent these sanctions.
However, some vocal proponents of the deal inside Iran say that it could position the country as a regional energy transit hub, which would enhance its geopolitical leverage and influence in global energy markets.
The economic newspaper Jahan-e Sanat published an opposing viewpoint on the project in an article titled "The Bizarre Matter of Exporting Russian Gas," in which experts criticized the deal as one of the worst Tehran has made.
Several experts have also publicly questioned why a country with the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves would facilitate the export of a rival’s gas instead of maximizing its own production and export capacity, the newspaper said.
“Have Iran's political authorities conceded that Iran's gas will never be extracted from the seas and deserts … to decide to sell another country’s gas to India, or perhaps other countries? Does this deal and Iran's agreement … to sell the rival’s gas for a small profit make sense?,” the piece read.
The news outlet also accused Russia and its state-controlled energy giant, Gazprom, of repeatedly failing to fulfill investment commitments in Iran’s gas industry, using some projects instead as a means to permanently distance Iran from global gas export markets.
While Iran does possess significant natural gas reserves, years of Western sanctions, self-imposed isolation, and mismanagement have severely hindered its production capacity.
The lack of access to modern technology and foreign investments has led to a decline in output, which is falling by approximately 5% annually, leaving production insufficient to meet even domestic demand.
Yet, supporters of the gas pipeline have noted the project’s potential to generate a steady income for Iran, which they argue could bolster Tehran’s economy amidst sanctions.
Economic publication Tejarat News, however, highlighted Iran’s current dependence on Russian gas imports to address domestic winter shortages. The outlet described it as ironic that Iran, once viewed as a potential alternative gas supplier to Europe, is now forced to import gas from Russia to meet its own needs.
Challenges to implementation
The gas transit project faces several challenges including the need to build new pipelines or upgrade existing ones in Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan.
“There is currently a pipeline through the Republic of Azerbaijan which can very quickly carry the Russian gas to Iran, but the pipeline can transit just 2 bcm of gas per year. New pressure boosting stations and compressors are required to increase the pipeline's capacity. This can take a year or so. Even doing that can increase the transit capacity only to around 8 to 10 bcm per year,” Iran energy expert Dalga Khatinoglu told Iran International.
Other challenges the ambitious project may encounter include the need to build or upgrade north-south pipelines in Iran to transport Russian gas to India and other potential buyers in the south, as well as competition from other producers, such as Qatar, in South and Southeast Asian markets.
Western sanctions on both Iran and Russia present significant challenges to the implementation of their plan, as these restrictions limit access to international financing, advanced technology, and crucial partnerships for large-scale infrastructure projects.
In a recent interview with NBC, President Pezeshkian stressed Tehran's readiness for dialogue with the US, while also stating that the Islamic Republic had no intentions of assassinating Donald Trump over the 2020 killing of the IRGC's Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad.
A senior aide to Pezeshkian, Ali Abdolalizadeh, claimed on Saturday that an agreement with the Trump administration could be reached within two or three months.
Recently, the Pezeshkian administration also undertook what some described as goodwill gestures, such as the offer to assist in controlling the wildfires in Los Angeles.
Ensaf News, a reformist outlet highly supportive of Pezeshkian, reported last week that the US and Israeli flags, which were painted on the ground for people to step on as they entered the presidential compound, were removed “several weeks ago.”
Khamenei repeats opposition to 'hostile' US
In his speech on December 30, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated that the US remains “hostile” to Iran and urged the nation to remain “a thousand times more vigilant”.
Khamenei advised against surrendering to American demands but did not explicitly address the prospect of negotiations with the US or the European parties to the nuclear deal.
As the government’s overtures grow, ultra-hardliners continue to highlight Khamenei’s past objections to negotiation with the US in general and with the Trump administration in particular, while also reiterating threats of avenging him for Soleimani's killing.
Is the government acting against Khamenei’s wishes?
The Pezeshkian administration’s moves appear at odds with Khamenei’s repeated declarations that the Islamic Republic would not engage with the Trump administration and his vow to avenge Soleimani’s assassination.
Notably, Khamenei refused to respond to a 2019 message from Trump delivered by then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Many Iranian analysts and politicians, however, argue that the Pezeshkian government could not proceed with such overtures without the Supreme Leader’s tacit approval.
For instance, the reformist newspaper Ham-Mihan accused state-run media outlets, such as Kayhan and the state broadcaster (IRIB), of portraying negotiations with the Trump administration as a "thick red line" after the US elections in November 2024.
“But the circumstances and a review of the positions and reactions show that this red line has long been gone and Iran does not rule out negotiations with the future US administration,” Ham-Mihan wrote.
Similarly, Ensaf News interpreted Pezeshkian’s remarks in the NBC interview as evidence that he has already received the green light to proceed with his plans to engage with the new US administration.
Pezeshkian signals the possibility of economic cooperation with the West
During Pezeshkian's interview with NBC, he also referred to the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement with Russia, suggesting that this did not mean the exclusion of the West in Iran's relations.
“We are going to sign a strategic agreement with Russia, the same ways as we did with China, and the same ways as we requested to have [one] with Europe … This does not just apply to Russia, we are prepared to sit down and sign this [type] of agreement with all countries that want to have a close, reasonable, and mutual agreement,” he said.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has also emphasized that the nature of the agreement with Russia was “primarily economic” and Kazem Jalali, Iran's ambassador to Moscow, has said that Iran “is not interested in joining any [Eastern or Western] blocs.”
Unlike agreements that Moscow has signed with Pyongyang and Minsk, Tehran’s deal with Moscow, very notably, did not include a mutual defense clause.
However, Iran has been supplying thousands of suicide drones and allegedly missiles to Russia that have been extensively used to target civilians and civilian installations in Ukraine since mid-2022.
But in the past few months, Iran's deep economic crisis compounded by sanctions Trump imposed in his first term, has become more serious, with its national currency losing 30% of its value since August. More officials and commentators allowed to speak in public have been calling for negotiations with the US.
Pezeshkian’s aide, Abdolalizadeh, has argued that Iran should not have excluded the US from its economic dealings with the international community after the conclusion of the 2015 nuclear deal known as the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).
“After the JCPOA, we allowed all countries to cooperate with Iran, but we blocked the Americans, and this raised the question of why the US was not allowed to be in Iran for economic cooperation?” he said, adding that the Obama team did not make their complaint public, but Trump would not tolerate such exclusion. “He said he would rip the JCPOA and we said we would burn it. Both sides regret it now.”
He added that, if sanctions are lifted, Iran's oil and gas sectors could become attractive opportunities for American and multinational companies.
Former Iranian diplomat and Princeton professor Hossein Mousavian also suggested in a recent opinion piece for The Hill that direct talks with the US, even at the presidential level, are no longer off-limits.
Mousavian, often labeled a "loyal regime insider" by the Iranian diaspora in the West, proposed that a potential agreement could pave the way for significant economic cooperation, with projects valued in the hundreds of billions of dollars across industries such as petrochemicals, aviation, and clean energy.
Navigating between East and West
Pundits in Iran say the Pezeshkian administration’s overtures to the new US administration, along with its efforts to avoid appearing overly eager to align with Moscow or Beijing, should be viewed through the lens of a ‘positive balancing’ foreign policy.
This approach contrasts with the traditional “Neither East nor West” slogan inscribed at the entrance of the foreign ministry building in central Tehran.
“This strategy neither accepts isolationism nor unquestioning submission to the demands of others,” political analyst Reza Raisi said in an article published by the reformist Ham-Mihan newspaper.