Israel arrests three over alleged Iranian espionage ties
On Tuesday, Israel charged one man and detained two others for espionage on behalf of Iran, according to the Shin Bet security service.
On Tuesday, Israel charged one man and detained two others for espionage on behalf of Iran, according to the Shin Bet security service.
The suspect, identified as Elimelech Stern, a 21-year-old from Beit Shemesh, a religious area outside Jerusalem ,was approached via the Telegram messaging app by an individual using the alias "Anna Elena."
He had been solicited to commit murder and arson. According to The Jerusalem Post, Stern was also instructed to perform various tasks, such as posting notices in Tel Aviv, depositing money at specific locations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and delivering packages containing menacing items, including a severed animal head or a doll with a knife and a threatening note.
Stern agreed to execute the tasks other than murder and starting a forest fire.
The investigation revealed that Iranian intelligence continues to use social media to contact and recruit individuals, employing fictitious profiles to conceal their identities.
Platforms such as Instagram, Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and X have all been utilized for these covert approaches, which are conducted in multiple languages, including Hebrew and English.
In recent months, Israeli media has reported the identification and monitoring of numerous fake profiles operated by Iranian security agencies. Extensive intelligence has been gathered on the entities orchestrating these operations, revealing their attempts to recruit individuals through social media and job listing websites.
The incident follows a similar case last year in which two Israelis were acquitted of espionage charges for Iran while a third was convicted of a related offense. The case initially involved serious accusations against five individuals with personal or familial connections to Iran.
Last year, Iran used a group of women trained to speak Hebrew to send sexually explicit images to Israeli soldiers in a bid to honey trap them and extort information.
Trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), they contacted the soldiers over social media, sending them explicit videos and photos to gain information.
Iran has long been a staunch supporter of Hamas, which has been embroiled in its most prolonged conflict with Israel since seizing control of Gaza in a violent coup in 2007.
Tehran has consistently supplied the militant group with financial assistance, weaponry, and training. This support includes the provision of advanced rockets, sophisticated military equipment, and technical expertise, all aimed at bolstering Hamas's capabilities in its ongoing conflict with its longstanding adversary.
On April 13, Iran itself launched missile and drone strikes on Israel, following an alleged Israeli airstrike in Damascus that resulted in the deaths of several senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Although Iran’s strike was largely neutralized with the assistance of the United States and other allies, it represented a significant escalation in the shadow war between the two archenemies.
In the latest occurrence within a series of his participation in Muharram mourning rituals, Pezeshkian was photographed on Tuesday alongside Esmail Qaani, the commander of the IRGC Quds Force. This event took place at a highly revered site for Shia Muslims dedicated to their Twelfth Imam.
During the lunar month of Muharram, Shia Muslims observe mourning rituals to commemorate the death of Husayn (Hussain) ibn Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad and the third Shia Imam.
Critics argue that amidst the nation's multifaceted challenges, Pezeshkian has not yet crafted a comprehensive agenda for his presidency or compiled a roster of prospective cabinet members, viewing his participation in these sessions as indicative of irresponsibility.
Akbar Ganji, a political commentator and former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) residing abroad, voiced his criticism on X, stating: "Hopefully, in a few days, the mourning ceremonies will end. Otherwise, I worry that Pezeshkian might forget the presidency and go from one religious gathering to another, reciting elegies and performing eulogies."
Meanwhile, Pezeshkian has yet to hold a press conference, as his scheduled news event on the day of his election was abruptly cancelled. Media in Tehran reported at the time that the cancellation was due to a meeting with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Critics argue that while Pezeshkian has found ample time to attend religious ceremonies, he has yet to allocate time for a press conference, even after more than a week since his election.
Meanwhile different social groups voice their demands publicly, hoping to receive attention from the new chief executive. The care-taker government just announced that it will stop offering cheap US dollars for imports of more than 450 items, only focusing on essential food and medicines. This immediately raised the price of iPhones by about $250.
Reza Shafakhah, Chair of the Committee on the Rights of the Children of the National Union of Lawyers Associations, urged Pezeshkian to prioritize educating underserved children.
“Mr. Pezeshkian, once you have concluded your participation in mourning sessions, kindly direct your Ministry of Interior to identify children deprived of education per the Law on the Protection of Children and Adolescents. Moreover, please ensure collaboration with the Ministry of Education to facilitate their access to schooling, particularly as the school enrollment season approaches,” Shafakhah wrote.
The criticisms extended to ordinary citizens on social media as well. One user remarked, "Experts such as Zarif have told Pezeshkian, 'Since you have no capability to select ministers, spend these few days attending religious gatherings and mourning. We will assemble the cabinet for you...'"
The user alluded to Pezeshkian appointing former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as the head of the Strategic Council for Transition, responsible for shortlisting candidates for ministerial and vice-presidential positions in the Pezeshkian administration. Thus far, Pezeshkian has not demonstrated any active involvement in the cabinet formation process.
Meanwhile, others defended Pezeshkian, stating that since he has not taken office as president, criticisms about his attendance at religious gatherings are unfounded. They also argue that attending these religious gatherings, predominantly held at night, does not imply a lack of responsibility or preclude his meaningful political work during the day.
"Dr. Pezeshkian has not officially assumed the presidency, so technically, he is not the president yet. Is it wrong for him to attend religious gatherings? Would it be acceptable if he went to a nightclub instead? Does a president or president-elect not have the right to eat, go to a mosque, or watch a football game?" a user wrote on X.
Some defend his actions by asserting his intrinsic religiosity and adherence to tradition, suggesting there is little beyond his religious convictions driving his behavior.
However, other defenders delve deeper, suggesting that Pezeshkian employs this strategy to reconcile the divide between hardliners and non-hardliners. Pezeshkian, elected as a reform-leaning candidate, secured victory in a runoff election against hardline opponents, indicating a narrower margin of support. Some contend that he aims to appeal to a broader population segment through these actions.
In these religious ceremonies, he is quoted as saying: "All individuals are human beings, not merely those who support us; even those who do not help us are part of humanity. We contend with ideological and factional differences; adherence to truth transcends such disputes."
A user wrote on X, “For now, let Pezeshkian be. He is tending to the deep wound inflicted upon his staunch supporters by his victory.”
Thus far, Pezeshkian has exemplified his pre-election pledge of unwavering obedience to the Supreme Leader's directives. Ali Khamenei places significant emphasis on these mourning rituals, particularly the Heyat, which refers to collective mourning groups or gatherings.
A Heyat constitutes a grassroots social movement within each neighborhood. Comprised of friends, relatives, neighbors, and individuals of all ages, these groups establish their facilities, known as Tekyehs, for conducting processions and ceremonies throughout Muharram.
Khamenei also emphasizes the significance of "Maddahan" (singular "Madah"), religious singers or eulogists, who traditionally appeared prominently in mosques and during religious observances such as mourning ceremonies. In recent years, however, eulogists have gained increasing influence, expanding their role into the political sphere and frequently offering commentary on diverse topics, including enforcing hijab and societal norms.
Khamenei went as far as to define what these Maddahan do as a soft power for the Islamic Republic.
“The art of eulogizing and the entity known as the "Heyat" represents a crucial element of the soft power within Islamic society. Soft power wields greater influence and efficacy than hard power,” the Supreme Leader said in January.
“Why do the world's powerful nations, such as the United States, possessing nuclear arsenals and a plethora of advanced weaponry, nevertheless channel their most significant investments into arts, cinema, Hollywood, advertising, and similar domains?
“The rationale is that cinema embodies soft power; storytelling and filmmaking constitute soft power. These cultural mediums engender lasting influence.
“Conversely, hard power yields immediate but transient effects. Hard power entails, for instance, the United States occupying Afghanistan for two decades, expending billions, only to eventually retreat under the duress of widespread animosity.
“In contrast, soft power is epitomized by a seemingly minority group possessing profound spiritual influence, capable of captivating global attention,” he added.
According to reformist daily Shargh, the council is tasked with shortlisting the candidates for ministerial and vice-presidential posts in the Pezeshkian administration. Iranian presidents usually have a “first vice-president” and several others in charge of critical government tasks.
Earlier, rumors said that Zarif was going to be the senior vice president in the new government, however, Zarif said last week that no one has been yet nominated for the post. Some of the reports during the past week mentioned Executives of Construction Party leader Hossein Marashi as a nominee for the post. However, Marashi's involvement in a variety of businesses may prevent him from joining the government.
Another potential nominee for the post is former vice-president Mohammad Reza Aref, who has faced heavy criticism from the press and politicians for his "inaction, indecision, and inefficiency" as the leader of the reformist faction in the Iranian parliament from 2016 to 2020.
Zarif has denied reports Pezeshkian is under pressure by other politicians including former President Mohammad Khatami to appoint certain individuals to posts in the new government.
Other reports quoted Mohammad Hashemi, a former state TV chief and a brother of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as saying that five committees or work groups have been set up to work on the forming of the new cabinet based on merits.
With the committees in place, the President-elect does not need recommendations by anyone to appoint his ministers, Hashemi said, adding that Pezeshkian has asked every committee to nominate three individuals for every ministry. He will eventually take his pick from among those nominated.
Meanwhile, in letters to civil institutions and political parties, Pezeshkian asked them last week to recommend individuals for ministerial posts in the government. The letters have even been sent to conservative political parties, reports say. Some of the criteria for the nominations are lowering the average age of the cabinet, national rather than factional tendencies, as well as honesty.
So far, former Minister of Economy Ali Tayebnia appears to be the most likely choice for the post. He is widely regarded in the reform and moderate camps, and even some conservatives, as having the expertise to rescue Iran from its economic crisis. The economist from Isfahan was instrumental in nearly convincing the entire government during the Rouhani administration that joining the FATF conventions could benefit Iran's economy. However, his efforts were ultimately obstructed by conservatives in the Expediency Council and the Supreme Council of National Security.
FATF is an international organization formed by G7 member countries to protect the international financial system and its recommendations shape banking policies of most countries and businesses who want to protect their own integrity and reputations. Thus, Iran’s international banking is severely impacted by its status in the FATF blacklist.
Lists have been going around on social media of possible cabinet ministers, but none are reliable. Some users are however aware that some of those lists are meant to groom individuals and introduce them to the new president.
The challenge with Pezeshkian's call for young, liberal ministers for his cabinet is that many of the reform-minded and moderate young men and women from middle-class families have left the country. The instability of previous governments has likely left them with little hope of returning to work in Iran. This situation is partly due to the lack of respect for expertise and academic credentials in administrations filled with officials holding fake diplomas.
Forming a cabinet with the goal of addressing numerous longstanding issues is a daunting task, particularly in the absence of young, educated experts and given the poor track record of older politicians across the Iranian political landscape. Cabinets are not easy to change or reshuffle frequently, making this challenge even more complex.
During his campaign, Pezeshkian once asked, "We bring foreign coaches for our football teams. Why shouldn't we be able to seek help from foreign advisers?" His question, which sounded naïve, was met with nothing but frowning faces.
We consider two indicators to capture the economic shocks in Iran: the market exchange rate of USD to Iranian rial and the price index of the Iranian stock market. The importance of looking at both indicators is that the first one is the anchor of inflationary expectations in Iran, and the second one is the best indicator available publicly for capturing the private sector’s response to a shock.
The plots below capture these indicators for the days leading to and after the sudden deaths of the president and foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. Based on these indicators, Iran’s economy did not experience any shocks.
Facing economic sanctions for most of the past decade, the Iranian economy is now more dependent on imports than before. This observation is in contrast with how Iranian authorities and some policy analysts in the US describe the Iranian economy as resilient against sanctions by tapping into domestic resources (e.g., Chapter 4 of the book How Sanctions Work by Narges Bajoghli et al., 2024). The term resistance economy coined by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is used in such contexts to prove the point. But, if the economy was truly more independent and self-sufficient, why do the economic indicators show considerably more sensitivity to internationally significant news compared to the domestic shocks? While Raisi’s death had little impact on the value of the Iranian currency, heightened tensions with Israel in April resulted in a sudden boost for the dollar in Tehran’s currency markets.
Promoting domestic production and becoming more self-sufficient require some fundamental conditions, such as a healthy private sector, protection of people’s rights, and institutional integrity. Since the inception of Islamic government in 1979, constitutional errors as well as repeated malpractices have compromised these basic prerequisites for improving the economy.
Among the constitutional deficiencies that directly lead to budget deficits and inflation is the lack of independence of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) as the authority responsible for the implementation of monetary policies. The governor of CBI shall be assigned or removed by the president. In the most recent version of the CBI’s governing law, nine out of ten voting members of the Supreme Council, the body responsible for the IR’s monetary policies, are either directly or indirectly assigned and removed by the president. This creates a conflict of interest as the government’s budget is financed by the money supply under the control of the central bank. Lack of independence for CBI means that each administration could draft a fiscally unbalanced budget, and CBI would compensate for the deficit by printing more money. This is one of the reasons that all governments since 1979 have drafted budgets with considerable fiscal deficits that favor their social policies and ambitions, only to exacerbate inflationary forces.
Privatization is another example of constitutional errors combined with malpractices by corrupt actors. Article 44 of the IR’s Constitution specifies that all major industries shall be owned by the government. That led to approximately 80% state ownership of Iran’s economy after the revolution. Twenty-five years later, in 2004, the article was amended to distribute the ownership of infrastructure and backbone industries among the private sector, cooperatives, and the state. Despite all the efforts of every government since 2004, the latest figures presented by members of chambers of commerce and other officials, as well as the CBI’s research, suggest the government, along with the office of supreme leader, and the public sector constitute between 60-80% of the economy.
Given that privatization has remained on paper for almost two decades of official proclamations, we could safely assume it is not an objective actively pursued by the authorities. Looking at the preconditions and impunities that Ali Khamenei offered to a task force he initiated in 2022 for the same purpose captures the realities and his true intentions for privatization. He assigned the vice president at the time, Mohammad Mokhber, to lead the privatization task force. While the majority of the members of the task force, including Mokhber himself, have on-going criminal cases in the IR’s courts for corruption, they are provided with judicial impunity, no parliamentary oversight is allowed, and there will be no transparency on price discovery mechanisms or accepting bids from the public.
In such a context, no single president could change the course of the country or the public’s perception of the economic conditions. It appears that some of the candidates in the recent presidential race had come to terms with this lack of power. Take the president-elect, Masoud Pezeshkian, who in his televised debate simply stated that he is nominated to execute what the Supreme Leader will envision and order. He did not even try to present any economic plans during his campaign.
The economic mismanagement in the Islamic Republic (IR) does not originate from any particular administration, nor is it corrected by successive governments. Over the past forty-five years, the IR has consistently made errors that have worsened the livelihood of the people year after year. Such malpractices, rampant corruption, and constitutional barriers to economic growth have inevitably led to a loss of public trust in the institution of the IR.
One consequence of this distrust is that inflationary expectations are anchored to the market exchange rate of the USD rather than the Central Bank of Iran’s interest rate adjustments. Similarly, the economy does not react to domestically disruptive news in the same way it responds to internationally significant events. While public distrust renders almost all economic policies of the IR ineffective—regardless of whether the government is reformist or conservative—the international community's role becomes increasingly significant for the Iranian public.
Given its inherent weaknesses, Iran’s economy is more vulnerable to foreign sanctions. The economy is more than ever dependent on imports. The agricultural sector is threatened by serious drought and water mismanagement. The industrial sector is worse off than a decade ago due to chronic negligence in investing in fixed capital formation, and the private sector is rapidly declining due to unequal competition with IRGC-affiliated actors that have deep pockets and benefit from influence over state institutions. Therefore, sanctions that target oil exports and revenues are effective in limiting the Islamic government’s ability to project power in the region and engage in domestic repression.