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A series of recent developments suggests nuclear talks between Iran and the United States have stalled, significantly increasing the risk of military confrontation, according to an analysis by Iran analyst Morad Veisi.
Veisi identifies ten key indicators of escalating tension, including: a sharp uptick in hostile rhetoric between Tehran and Washington, a complete halt in direct and expert-level negotiations, and a lack of new diplomatic initiatives.
The US has resumed sanctions targeting Iran’s financial networks, while Israel has intensified military drills and regional proxy clashes have surged, the analyst said, adding that Iran is also importing large volumes of rocket fuel chemicals, signaling continued missile program expansion.
Other red flags include the appointment of a hardline US military commander to oversee the Middle East, and a likely censure of Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors, backed by European powers.
He believes that Tehran may be underestimating the potential for direct US or Israeli military action.
A potential visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Tehran may offer a final diplomatic window to avert escalation, Veisi concluded.
US President Donald Trump’s recent remarks and actions suggest a dwindling interest in diplomacy with Iran, despite five rounds of indirect nuclear talks, according to an analysis published by the Tehran Times.
The Tehran Times argued that Trump's “zero-sum demands” and fresh US sanctions show a preference for pressure over compromise.
Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One on Friday, Trump once again said that Iran cannot enrich uranium inside the country, adding, “There is not going to be enrichment [of uranium in Iran].”
“Donald Trump’s strategy regarding Iran’s nuclear program is characterized not by a sincere intent to achieve a fair and enduring agreement, but by maneuvers focused on enforcing unilateral conditions," read the article.
Since the US exited from the 2015 nuclear deal, Tehran has neither raced toward a bomb nor returned to full compliance, maintaining a state of strategic suspension that might best be described as rule at the threshold.
Grown—partly at least—out of necessity, the inaction has with time hardened into a governing doctrine: a form of power rooted less in coherent planning than in the instincts of political survival.
Iran’s rulers have learned to wield ambiguity as leverage, drawing strength not from action but its possibility. That is why they view enrichment as essential.
Maintaining near-weapons level enrichment without actual weaponization—the threshold condition—generates enough uncertainty to make Western powers cautious about Tehran’s next move. It creates a degree of deterrence without escalation.
But that effect appears to be eroding.
Internationally, the tolerance threshold for such maneuvering has narrowed. Domestically, endless uncertainty has undercut the rulers’ legitimacy and drained public resilience—driving growing numbers into apathy or protest.
Enrichment: suspension as power
Iranian officials have repeatedly denied any intention to build nuclear weapons, citing a religious ruling by supreme leader Ali Khamenei that forbade their use in 2010.
Still, after the United States exited the nuclear deal in 2018, Iran resumed enrichment and now possesses more than 274 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, according to the IAEA’s February 2025 report.
Inspectors have also confirmed that Iran has the technical infrastructure to reach weapons-grade capacity.
Nuclear experts have been debating Iran’s ‘break out time’ for many years. But the threshold status may be less of a transitional stage than it is a chosen posture: deter without provoking.
Without ever testing a bomb, Tehran has altered the regional military balance, particularly with Israel. Ambiguity has kept global powers on alert, calculating whether to cooperate with or contain Iran.
At home, this posture yields symbolic capital: scientific progress, defiance, and dignity. Enrichment has been folded into the Islamic Republic’s core narrative.
As indirect talks with the United States resume, the threshold position remains a pillar of Tehran’s strategy. But this time, the international response is sharper.
Calling for permanent inspections, proposing offshore stockpile transfers and—above all—Washington’s insistence on “zero enrichment” may suggest that the era of ambiguity is running out of road.
Sanctions: prolonging suspension
Sanctions have reinforced the threshold logic. They have damaged Iran’s economy but not collapsed it. They have left the country on the edge—in a prolonged state of uncertainty where everything seems possible, but nothing is guaranteed.
President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign has transformed sanctions: from broad embargoes to surgical strikes, targeting Iran’s critical sectors—missiles, drones, petrochemicals, dual-use technologies—applying pressure where it hurts most.
The aim, it appears, is not just to punish, but to constrict the Islamic Republic’s strategic arteries. Yet the targeted sanctions have not forced a retreat. Even as its economy bleeds and its regional allies perish, the regime’s rhetoric sharpens.
Iran’s increasingly aggressive tone against Britain, France and Germany—who can reimpose UN sanctions halted under the 2015 deal—might be a sign of self-confidence or deep unease.
Sanctions have clearly shaped Tehran’s behavior. But they have not broken its logic.
Iran’s rulers continue to see the nuclear ambiguity as their last safeguard of strategic balance, a critical bargaining chip they cannot afford to lose.
Suspension: eroding the nation
For now, Iran is unlikely to rush toward weaponization. But it is equally unwilling to dismantle its nuclear capability.
Iran's adversaries, lacking better tools, continue to rely on sanctions and vague ultimatums. Both sides, in effect, sustain the Islamic Republic’s threshold posture.
But the logic is fraying.
The United States and Europe appear to have lost patience with Tehran. Washington’s call for zero enrichment and Europe's warnings about a return of UN sanctions may signal a wish to step out of ambiguity, a will to end chronic suspension.
Domestically, too, the cost of this posture is rising.
A society long held in suspense now faces fatigue, frustration, and declining trust. What once symbolized resistance has come to represent gridlock. “Dignity” has curdled into a deadlock.
The leadership in Tehran may persist in this suspended state, but its power to dictate the terms of uncertainty is weakening. The ‘calculated ambiguity’ looks more like a trick revealed.
What once shielded the Islamic Republic is now hastening its erosion. It will either change course or collide with reality, at home and abroad.
Arab states astride the Persian Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are pursuing a hedging strategy to navigate growing risks from Iran’s advancing nuclear program, according to an analysis published Thursday by Israel’s Alma Research and Education Center.
The report said that Iran’s uranium stockpile enriched to 60% now exceeds 400 kg—theoretically enough for nearly ten nuclear weapons.
According to the analysis, Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors are preparing for two possible outcomes: a military strike—likely Israeli or US-led—on Iran’s nuclear facilities, or a new US-Iran agreement that might allow Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
While publicly supporting diplomacy, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are quietly distancing themselves from direct confrontation with Iran, balancing outreach with deterrence, Alma said. The UAE maintains economic ties with Tehran while cooperating militarily with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and Riyadh is boosting its defense posture through a $142 billionarms framework with the United States.
“There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia continues to see Iran and its proxies as a central threat,” Alma said.
Iran’s ambition to serve as a regional energy hub is faltering, with key neighbors losing confidence in Tehran’s ability to fulfil its commitments and shifting to alternative suppliers.
Turkey, long a major customer, imported over 5 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States in the first quarter of 2025, according to Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA).
That’s nearly the same volume as in all of 2024—which itself marked a 38% jump from 2023. The United States is now Turkey’s second-largest gas supplier after Russia, displacing Iran.
Meanwhile, Iran is grappling with year-round gas deficits. Last winter, domestic shortages roughly equaled Turkey’s daily seasonal demand.
EMRA data shows that Iran’s winter deliveries to Turkey have halved over the past two years, failing to meet the agreed quota in every month of the cold season.
A 25-year agreement between Tehran and Ankara expires next year. Despite repeated offers to renew, Turkey has shown little interest, bolstering its energy ties with Russia, Azerbaijan, and the US.
In March, Ankara began importing gas from Turkmenistan through swap deals via Iran—further reducing direct reliance on Iranian supply.
Iraq and Syria: shrinking markets
Iraq, Iran’s only remaining major gas customer, has also reported a sharp drop in supply.
Reduced deliveries from Iran have cut electricity production by 3,000 megawatts, according to Iraqi officials, just as summer demand peaks. Iran now supplies only 3% of Iraq’s electricity needs, down from 10% just a few years ago.
Turkey has stepped into the void, doubling its electricity exports to Iraq in 2025 and now supplying more than twice the volume Iran provides.
Tehran earns an estimated $5.5 billion annually from electricity and gas exports. Yet the strategy of converting regional political leverage into economic gains appears to be unraveling.
For years, Iran spent tens of billions of dollars supporting armed groups in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, hoping to convert influence into energy contracts and infrastructure projects. But the hard-gained influence all but vaporised with Israeli strikes and the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Syria, once a central partner in Tehran’s ambitions, has effectively cut ties. Iraq plans to end reliance on Iranian gas within two years.
Lost Ground
From 2012 to 2023, Iran sent more than 300 million barrels of free crude oil to Syria—worth $23 billion, according to energy analytics firm Kpler— in hopes of securing energy and industrial dominance in postwar reconstruction.
Last week, Syria’s interim government signed a $7 billion deal with Qatari, Turkish and US firms to build 6,000 megawatts of new generation capacity.
Turkey will supply 2 billion cubic meters of gas annually, while Qatar began gas shipments via Jordan in March, bypassing Iran entirely.
Even before Assad’s fall, Iran lagged behind. Turkey exported 15 times more goods to Syria than Iran. Today, Iran’s trade has all but stopped, while Turkish exports to Syria topped $1 billion in the first four months of 2025 — a 32% increase over the same period last year.
